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Abstract This paper develops a method to use data from singles in a non–parametric
collective household setting. We use it to test the controversial assumption of preference
stability between singles and couples. Our test allows for unobserved heterogeneity by
defining finite-dimensional types of households according to their revealed preference re-
lations. We show how to derive a test statistic by constructing hypothetical matches of
heterogeneous individuals into different types of households using tools from stochastic
choice theory. We strongly reject the preference–stability hypothesis based on consump-
tion data from the Dutch LISS, the Russian RLMS, and the Spanish ECPF panels.
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1 Introduction
Measuring poverty levels, quantifying the effects of socio-economic policies on indi-
viduals, and generally understanding the mechanisms of individual decision making
are pivotal challenges for economists and economic policy makers. Most of the rel-
evant datasets, however, do not feature granular enough information to meet these
challenges because a majority of individuals live in collective units, such as households
∗Click here or onto the title to download the most recent version. Stefan Hubner
(stefan.hubner@bristol.ac.uk) gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Netherlands Organ-
isation for Scientific Research (NWO) through a TOP Grant. The author would also like to thank
Arthur van Soest, Laurens Cherchye, Frederic Vermeulen, Stefan Hoderlein, Ian Crawford, Yuichi
Kitamura, Jörg Stoye, John Quah, Martin Browning, and various participants from the Heterogeneity
in Supply and Demand workshop (2016) for their helpful comments.
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or families. Trying to get inside this black box, without observing information about
resource sharing within the household, economists make two prevalent assumptions.1
First, preferences are independent of the state of an individual’s relationship: single
or couple. Second, preference heterogeneity is largely described by two types: men
and women.
In this paper, we construct a test of the former and thoroughly extend the lat-
ter. We will do so without observing any transitions between relationship states, and
without observing more than aggregate household-level choices. In order to avoid re-
jecting the hypothesis based on auxiliary restrictions, the test is fully non-parametric
and allows for a heterogeneous population. Preference homogeneity is particularly
restrictive in the context of the collective model since it not only requires every indi-
vidual to have the same preferences but also assumes that any two individuals matched
as a couple would arrive at the exact same sharing of resources. Instead, here we spe-
cify a collective random utility model with continuous consumption and an arbitrary
dimension of unobserved distribution factors and preference parameters.2 We then
construct discrete heterogeneous household types for both couples and singles in a
way that ensures that any two households which are not distinguishable in terms of
their preferences without a functional form restriction are equivalent. The test is then
constructed by considering the population of rational couples, satisfying the Collect-
ive Axiom of Revealed Preference (Cherchye, De Rock & Vermeulen, 2007), and the
population of rational singles, satisfying the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference
(Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982), as a baseline. Observing only their respective distribu-
tions of consumption choices, we ask the question if these distributions could have
been generated from an unobserved combination of hypothetical matches between dif-
ferent types of individuals into a mutually coherent household. We show that, under
the null hypothesis of stable preferences, such a stochastic rationalisation of the data
exists.
A difficulty when using or testing preference stability is the presence of consump-
1Cf. the seminal work of: Browning, Chiappori & Lewbel (2013), Lewbel & Pendakur (2008) for
identification of resource shares based on single households, Mazzocco, Ruiz & Yamaguchi (2014),
Voena (2015), Gayle & Shephard (2019) for identification in the context of inter-temporal models, and
Chiappori, McCann &Nesheim (2009), Cherchye et al. (2017) endogenous marriage market matching
models, respectively.
2Unobserved distribution factors are random variables effecting the bargaining power, but not the
preferences of an individual; for example desirability on the marriage market (Hubner, 2018).
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tion externalities. Without further assumptions, they prohibit disentangling adjust-
ments of consumption behaviour due to preference changes from the acquired possib-
ility of consuming a good publicly as a couple, i.e. changes in Lindahl prices. For ex-
ample, consider individuals with stable preferences commuting to work by car. While
as a single they have to pay market prices for gasoline, as a couple they can share the
burden and consequently consume more other goods, which could lead us to believe
that preferences have changed. For this reason, for our baseline setup we consider
a generalisation of the Beckerian caring model (Becker, 1981), which restricts us to
only consider strictly private goods for the empirical test. As an extension, we then
present a modification of the standard model in which we allow for externalities (pub-
lic goods) by adapting a linear household production function. While the production
technology is not identified in our setting, we calibrate the model using parameter
estimates obtained by Cherchye, De Rock & Vermeulen (2012a).
In order to identify preference relations for singles and couples, we make use of
(short) panel data and a common time-homogeneity of preferences assumption. We
apply our test to three popular datasets: the Dutch Longitudinal Internet Studies for
the Social Sciences (LISS), the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS), and the
Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (Encuesta Continua de Presupuestos Fa-
miliares, ECPF) used by Cherchye, De Rock & Vermeulen (2012b), Cherchye, De
Rock & Vermeulen (2011), and Adams et al. (2014), respectively, in the context of the
collective model. We consistently reject the hypothesis of preference stability for all
these datasets for both private and public goods.
In contrast to the discrete approach, we propose in this paper, testing preference
restrictions in a continuous setting is often based on the Slutsky matrix which re-
quires estimation of household demands and their derivatives. Browning & Chiap-
pori (1998) construct a test of collective rationality based on a parametric almost ideal
demand system with additive measurement errors. Similar to this, Brugler (2016) es-
timates a parametric quadratic ideal demand system (Banks, Blundell & Lewbel, 1997)
in a setting without preference heterogeneity and compares the parameter estimates
for single men, single women and couples to draw conclusions about preference sta-
bility. While almost ideal demand systems provide a flexible functional parametric
form where parameter restrictions can be easily tested, the potential for model mis-
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specification and consequential type I errors caused by an inconsistent specification
of the functional form restriction can be problematic. In addition to this, even in a
fully parametric setting, identification of continuous demand systems in the presence
of general unobserved heterogeneity is difficult due to the structure of the collective
model, which leads to demands that are non-separable with respect to unobserved
preference and bargaining heterogeneity. Also in a continuous choice setting, Hub-
ner (2018) develops a non-parametric collective random utility model and derives
restrictions for non-parametric identification of idiosyncratic utility functions and
Pareto weights by showing global invertibility of demands, under the assumption of
observed private demands. We do not require such a strong form of identification for
our test.
To our knowledge, the use of singles data in the context of the fully non-parametric
way to model collective households using revealed preference restrictions (Cherchye,
De Rock & Vermeulen, 2007, 2009) is novel. The advantage of a revealed preference
based approach is that it allows us to use a stochastic random utility and random dis-
tribution factor version of the collective model without requiring global invertibility.
Revealed stochastic preference settings have recently been used in the context of the
unitary consumption model. Hoderlein & Stoye (2014) consider the weak axiom of
revealed preference in the unitary model. In particular, they use the fact that demands
of a heterogeneous population observed in a given price regime can be characterised
as random variables supported on a normalised budget set. Observing the same pop-
ulation in different price regimes (repeated cross-sections), one can then use copula
techniques to derive (Frechet-Hoeffding) bounds on the probability that the popula-
tion behaves irrationally, i.e. is not in line with the weak axiom. Kitamura & Stoye
(2018); Deb et al. (2017) integrate this approach into the stochastic choice framework
of McFadden & Richter (1991) and McFadden (2005) by fully discretising budget sets
using partitions which contain all the relevant information to test the strong axiom
of revealed preference.
The construction of our test statistic is closely related to these approaches. We
show that the large sample theory developed in Kitamura & Stoye (2018) applies to
our test statistic and use their results for our statistical inference. We complement this
by implementing a fast, parallel non-negative least squares algorithm which leverages
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the sparsity of the computational problem in Haskell and conduct a simulation study
to evaluate finite sample size and power of the test statistic in our setting.
2 Test Design
We start by specifying a collective random utility model with two-person households.




consumes a bundle of goods from a finite set of alternatives
which is a proper subset ofRL+ . We denote continuous individual private consumption






+ be continuous household consumption chosen
by household i ∈ IN in period t ∈ IT . We assume that a household, characterised by
observed (pt ,w t ) and unobserved εc = (εm, ε f , εµ), each elements of a Polish space3,




um (xm, x f , εm) + µ(p, εµ)u f (x f , xm, ε f )
}
(1)
s.t. x f + xm ∈ Bt =
{
x | pt x ≤ w t
}
,
where µ is the relative bargaining power of spouse f (Chiappori, 1988, 1992). By in-
troducing the possibly infinite-dimensional random variable εc we allow each house-
hold to optimise a different objective function according to idiosyncratic preferences
and distribution factors.4 For each period t ∈ IT we observe expenditures for a given
good l ∈ IL denoted by pt,l x ci,t,l . Observing prices pt then allows us to calculate the
vector of continuous household consumption x ci,t for each household i ∈ IN .




who, under the stable prefer-
ence assumption, maximises the same ur (x r , x r ′, εr ) subject to the constraint x r ∈ Bt
according to the standard unitary model. For them, the spouse’s consumption x r ′ is
zero. Thus for single households we conveniently observe x c = x r . Conversely, due
to potential complementaries arising from joint consumption of a good with a po-
tential partner, without further restrictions, these zeros will cause an ill-posed utility
maximisation problem for single households. Thus, in order to model singles in a
way that makes them informative for a couple’s consumption behaviour we make the
3It can be shown that any preference relation can be expressed as an infinite–dimensional vector of
random variables, from which one can construct a random utility function.
4Note that, this idiosyncratic characterisation of individuals renders the requirement of assigned
gender and heterosexuality, traditionally used as the only form of heterogeneity, redundant. In our
exposition we will, nevertheless, retain the commonly used labels f and m for readability.
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following separability assumption.





be denoted as MRSr (x r , x r ′) with components MRSrl (x




l = 1, . . . ,L − 1. Then for r ≠ r ′ we have dMRSr (x r , x r ′)/dx r ′ = 0L−1,L−1.
This is standard assumption and required whenever preference stability is used as
an identification strategy in the collective model. It states that the marginal rates of
substitution for own good consumption does not depend on the spouse’s consump-
tion. A sufficient condition for this is separability of the form ur (x r , x r ′, εr , εr ′) =
G (g (x r , εr ), x r ′, εr ′) for any two differentiable, increasing, real-valued functions G
and g . While this assumption allows for positive consumption externalities, it restricts
the way the behaviour of a person is altered when entering or exiting a relationship.
For example, it rules out non-cooperative, strategic behaviour of individuals towards
their spouse. This assumption nests popular specifications such as the egoistic model
ur = g , but also the Beckerian caring model with altruistic preferences (Becker, 1981).
In this specification, utilities of one spouse are defined in terms of own-good con-
sumption and the utility of the spouse, i.e. ur (x r , εr ) =W (U r (x r , εr ),U r ′ (x r ′, εr ′))
whereU f andUm are real-valued sub-utility functions with the usual properties and
W is a strictly increasing, differentiable real-valued function.5 In the baseline setting,
we make this assumption to disentangle separability from stable preferences, or oth-
erwise, we would test both assumptions jointly. In either case, a rejection implies
that preferences cannot be treated as independent of the relationship status. In Sec-
tion 5 we discuss an extension of this general setting using a homogenoeus household
production technology and present results for public goods as a robustness check.
In the collective model, demands of each spouse are in general not observable and
thus their individual preferences are not identified directly from data of cohabiting
couples. Using the stable preference assumption, how can we exploit information about
single households in order to identify u f and um?
To answer this question, we first characterise consumers in terms of their finite-
dimensional revealed preference relations. Both the collective and the unitary model
impose restrictions on how both household and individual demandsmust change with
5We can write ur (x r , εr ) = ur (x r , x r ′, εr , εr ′) because the Beckerian model is observationally equi-
valent with egoistic individual utility functions in the collective model.
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respect to relative price changes. These sets of restrictions are known as the Collect-
ive Axiom of Revealed Preference and the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference, both
defined in Appendix A.1. The axioms allow us to partition unobserved heterogeneity
in the following way. Let Er =
Kr⋃
kr=1





kr ∈ IKr it holds that for any εrkr , ξ
r
kr
∈ Ekr we have Rr (εrkr ) = R
r (ξ rkr ) where R
r are
the preference relations resulting from our random utility model (4) with household
utility evaluated at um (xm, εmkm )+µ(p, ε
c
kc
)u f (x f , ε fk f ). Consequently, without losing
any important information, we map infinite dimensional unobserved heterogeneity
into a finite-dimensional collection of graphs representing all possible revealed prefer-
ence relations R f , Rm and Rc .6 We can directly identify them from data by making
the following standard assumption (Cherchye, De Rock & Vermeulen, 2007, 2011):
Assumption 2. (i) Unobserved preferences and distribution factors are constant over
time, so that εri = ε
r




, t ∈ IT and i ∈ IN .
(ii) We observe choices for each household (couples and singles) for at least three periods.
The time-homogeneity assumption of preferences is needed so that we can treat
different periods as different price regimes. To be more precise, we have to assume
that preferences do not change over time, such that we can treat the heterogeneity of
choices between periods t ∈ IT as a consequence of individuals facing different prices
pt , rather than a change in preferences over time. Again, we discuss several possible
extensions and ways to substitute this assumpion by different ones in Section 5.
Let R f ,Rm ∈ Xm = X f and Rc ∈ Xc . While, the construction of the type
space X f is straightforward, constructing Xc requires an extension of the space of
goods.7 Considering a finite number of choice types allows us to fully characterise
hypothetically matched households, by considering the product space X = Xc ×X f ×
Xm . This should be interpreted as matching different consumption types R f (ε f ) and
Rm (εm) into different types of bargaining agreements Rc (εc ). Under the preference
stability assumption, which ensures that single male and single female households
are informative for the respective spouse’s behaviour within a couple, each match,
6We use Rc = Rc0 as notation. It does not actually represent a preference relation, since household
consumption is only a result of individual preferences.
7This is due to the requirement of embedding information about double sums to evaluate CARP
restrictions (iv) & (v) in Definition 1 of Appendix A.1. A discussion of the construction of type spaces
for a minimal economy can be found in Appendix A.3.
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Figure 1: Visualisation: Stochastic Collective Revealed Preferences
Couple (Xc, π c )




















Note: 3-partite graph where the nodes represent discrete consumption decisions (revealed preference
types) and the partitioning is such that there are three disjoint classes each representing the set of
discrete decisions under a given household composition – single female f , single male m and couples
and c . The marginal distributions π c , π f and πm , supported on Xc , X f and Xm , respectively, are
identified from data. Edges between the type represent hypothetically matched households. Every
possible match, represented by a tuple of edges, can be classified as rational or irrational according to
a given set of restrictions.
characterised by the three-tuple (Rc,Rm,R f ), should behave rationally according to
the collective model. Figure 1 presents a clustered graph representation of the type
space for matched households. The edges between the nodes represent hypothetical
matches and are not observed from data.
Thus, in a second step, we show that by using information about singles we can
fully validate the revealed preference axioms for a heterogeneous population while
only observing marginal distributions of choices for households with different com-
positions. To see this, let the probability that option ξ j ∈ Xr is chosen by a house-
hold of a given composition r be denoted as π (ξ j |Xr ). By definition of our type
space, this is equivalent to the probability of a household being of type Rrj . We call
this a stochastic choice in situation Xr and will often refer to it as the marginal dis-
tribution of choices under a given household composition. We can consistently es-
timate these distributions from sample frequencies. Using principles from stochastic
choice theory (McFadden & Richter, 1991; McFadden, 2005), we can ask the question
whether there exists a probability measure ν over an appropriate subset of matched






. With this construction, the choice function X ↦→ Ξ(X), de-





. We say that the stochastic choice π is stochastic-




, it holds that
π (ξ j |Xr ) = ν (
{
Ξ ∈ X0 : ξ j = Ξ(Xr )
}
for some probability measure ν . Intuitively, if
the choices in different states of the world (hypothetical matches) can be rationalised
by a probability distribution over a set of rational matched household types (edges
consistent with Ξ), we can say that the population is rational with respect to the de-
cision rule Ξ.
Finally, how can we test the preference stability assumption by choosing the ap-
propriate decision rule? For this, we partition the universe of types X = Xcollective ∪
Xalternative, where the set Xcollective contains all types of couples Rc for which there ex-
ists a tuple (H f ,Hm), which is consistent with the collective axiom as in Cherchye,
De Rock & Vermeulen (2007, 2011). In order to use the actual respective preference
relations (R f ,Rm) for a given matched household type, we require the preference sta-
bility assumption. We denote the subset of households who remain consistent with
the collective axiom after replacing (H f ,Hm) by (R f ,Rm) as X0 = Xcollective \X1. Its
complement X1 then consists of the cases which satisfy the collective axiom based on
couples data but are not consistent with the collective axiom if preference relations
from singles are added. Thus, for our test, we drop all cases that are not collectively
rational and test X0 against X1 to answer the question whether the stable preference
hypothesis holds.8 If we find that among the collectively rational couples it is not
possible to rationalise observed choice probabilities using the types belonging to the
set X0, then we can conclude that the hypothesis of stable preferences does not hold.
8Alternatively, one could test Xcollective against Xalternative. In fact, this is what Cherchye, De Rock
& Vermeulen (2007) do which does not require single data since such a test can be based on aggregate
consumption only and the whole joint distribution of such choices is directly identified from data.
Equally, by adding single data and assuming separable and stable preferences one could test X0 against
X1 ∪ Xalternative to obtain a stronger test of the collective model compared to the previous one. While
this test has more power, it comes with the drawback of only applying to a separable caring-typemodel.
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3 Test Statistic
To construct a test statistic, it will be useful to represent the abstract choice rule Ξ, as
something more traceable. McFadden & Richter (1991); McFadden (2005) show that
stochastic choices can be represented by a linear system of equations Aν = π. Lemma
1 summarises and extends some of these results.
Lemma 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) The population defined by choice distribution π and choice rules belonging to X0
according to the random collective utilitymodel (4) is rational and satisfies the stable
preference assumption.
(ii) There exists ν ∈ Δ|X0 | such that Aν = π where ΔM is the M -dimensional probability
simplex and where the columns of A represent an exhaustive list of rational types
according to (4) under the preference stability assumption.
(iii) Let ν = 0. Then the vector ν solves JN (π, ν) := N minη∈{Aν |ν≥ν} (π − η)
TΩ(π −
η) = 0 where Ω is a positive definite square weighting matrix.
(iv) Similarly, for ν = 0 the vector ν is a fixed point under the operation
Ψπ,ν : s ↦→ max(0, s − diag(H ι)−1(HT s + f (π, ν)) (2)
where H = ATΩA and f (π, ν) = −ATΩ(π − Aν).
Proof. See Appendix A.2 
A typical column of the matrix A is a hypothetically matched coherent couple, i.e.
it stacks amale type (Rm ), a female type (R f ), and a couple type (Rc ) each individually
rational, but also mutually coherent. In order to construct the matrix, we consider
a matrix with
∑
r∈{c, f ,m} |X
r | rows and |X0 | columns, where |Xr | is the number of
choices a household can make under a given composition. We then split all columns
A,k with k ∈ I |X0 | into 3 blocks of respective length |Xc |, |X f | and |Xm | and denote





then Ar , j,k = 1 and zero otherwise. In the graph interpretation of the
type space in Figure 1, a block refers to a cluster of the graph and amatch is represented
by a column of the matrix A, where a row value of 1 indicates the active node.
Similarly, we obtain choice probabilities π by consistently estimating the em-
pirical distribution of finite-dimensional household types from the continuous dis-
10





be a vector with
∑
r∈{c, f ,m} |X
r | rows representing observed choice probabilities.













r } where Rri is the type (preference relation) of house-
hold i ∈ INr and our sample is partitioned as IN = INc ∪ IN f ∪ INm .
The way the matrix A is constructed, ν is not point-identified in Aν = π since A is
far from full column rankwith |X0 | >> ∑r∈{c, f ,m} |Xr |. Thus wemake use of the equi-
valence between (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 1 and estimate η by projecting observed choice
probabilities π̂ onto a τN -tightened9 linear cone C = {Aν : ν ≥ τN ι} by minimising
the projection residuals JN (π̂, ιτN ). We set τN = 1H
√
logN
N where N = Nf∧Nm∧Nc





in the sample.10 To obtain the critical value, we then use a non–




for each b ∈ IB , where
B the number of bootstrap repetitions. Let η̂τN be the argument producing the pro-
jection residuals JN (π̂, ιτN ). The centred choice probabilities π̂bτN = π̂
b − π̂ − η̂τN
are then used to approximate the empirical distribution FJN of JN (π̂, ιτN ). Then,










JN (π̂, τN ι) ≤ F̂ −1JN (1 − α)
)
= 1 − α. (3)
The projection residuals are calculated for each bootstrap repetition and it will
prove useful to rewrite Lemma 1.(iii) as the solution of a non-negative least squares
problem and implement a fast algorithm for solving it. The most commonly used
method to solve this is sequential quadratic programming, c.f. Lawson & Hanson
(1995).11 Due to the high dimensionality of our problem, it is preferable to use
coordinate-wise projection such as in Franc, Hlavac & Navara (2005) or Landweber’s
gradient descent method (Johansson et al., 2006) approach as it requires only O(k)
computations instead of O(k3), where k = |X0 | is the (generally very large) number
9The tightening parameter τN is calibrated based on the results of our simulation study. The reason
we require this feature is that many of the inequality constraints describing the cone are binding. With
the parameter being on the boundary of the parameter space the bootstrap procedure we use would
not be valid; Andrews (2000).
10The calibration of this parameter withstands different experiments performed as part of theMonte
Carlo study in Appendix A.4.
11This algorithm is used for lsqnonneg in Matlab and optimize.nnls in SciPy.
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of rational types in the NNLS problem. Equation (2) in Lemma 1.(iv) represents a
step using Landweber’s method, which we implement from first principles, in order
to leverage the sparsity of the matrix A.
Appendix A.4 discusses the results of a simulation study in which we evaluate the
power of our test by plotting empirical rejection frequencies against the proportion
of households not optimising according to a given decision rule and its size by eval-
uating type 1 errors under worst case scenarios. We find that the test has power to
detect an "irrational" population of close to one with 500 observations per household
composition if only 15% of the sample do not behave according to the model. If the
sample size is doubled, the required proportion drops to 5%. In addition to this, we
discuss worst cases by considering "similar matches" and show that the size of the test
is correct under different worst-case samples.
4 Results
In this section, we apply our test to three different datasets. Two of them are widely
used in our context: The Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) and the
Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF). Neither of these datasets
have information about allocation of consumption between the spouses. We comple-
ment this by also applying the test to the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social
Sciences (LISS), a higher quality dataset which includes more information than re-
quired. The results are consistent between the three datasets. In all cases, we reject
the hypothesis of stable preferences.
For the test we consider households consisting of singles or couples. We exclude
households with children or other cohabiting groups of individuals who are not in
a romantic relationship. We consider a minimal setting with three periods and three
goods, where we have 64 types of singles and 512 types of couples, resulting in 2, 996
collectively rational matched household types who satisfy the stable preference as-
sumption.12 Two of the panels we study are longer than required. Consequently, we
evaluate different combinations of years and goods from a range of pre–defined private
12See Appendix A.3 for a detailed discussion of this setting.
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goods.13 After dropping incomplete and boundary cases, we select years and goods
based on the resulting sample size. Due to attrition in panels, this procedure tends to
pick out consecutive years. As such, we face the trade–off between a small sample size
and small price variation, where the latter decreases the power in any revealed prefer-
ence setting (see e.g. Beatty & Crawford, 2011). Thus, in addition to the combination
with the largest sample size, we report a range of such combinations for a fixed group
of goods, in descending order of Ncouples + Nsingles.
First, we apply our test to the time use and consumption module (Cherchye, De
Rock & Vermeulen, 2012b) from the Dutch LISS (Longitudinal Internet Studies for
the Social Sciences) panel. This longitudinal study is collected by CentERdata and
consists of 5000 households and 8000 individuals, which are drawn from the popu-
lation register of Statistics Netherlands. The survey is internet-based where house-
holds are provided with the necessary hardware to participate in the study. Prices
are obtained from the Dutch CPI for different consumption categories published by
Eurostat (normalized to 100 for the year 2005). We select the private consumption
categories: clothing, food & beverages and recreation.
Second, we consider phase two of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey
(RLMS), collected in form of a personal interview by the Carolina Population Center
(University of North Carolina) and available for the years 1994 – 2014. Due to a lot of
missing or zero values of other types of private consumption expenditures, we focus
on different categories of food.14 The survey distinguishes between 57 different food
consumption categories, which we further aggregate to dairy, bread and meat. These
three categories account for more than half of the food consumption. Price data is
obtained from the Federal State Statistics Service (GKS) and available for the years:
2000, 2005, 2010, 2011 – 2015.
Third, to validate the results above, we apply the test to data from the Spanish
Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF), collected by the Spanish statistics
office (INE) on a quarterly basis for the period 1985 – 2005. The survey is designed
in a way that participants are part of the sample for at most eight consecutive periods
or two years. There was a discontinuity in the design of the study in 1997, where
13Wemake use of a weak separability assumption that is standard in the empirical demand estimation
literature which allows us to be able to consider a subset of goods for estimation.
14The median household income is RUB 28, 000, of which RUB 7, 500 is spent on food.
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the focus was shifted away from detailed consumption expenditure categories. While
the ECPF was replaced by the Encuesta de Presupuestos Familiare (EPF) in 2006,
unfortunately the collection frequency of this newer version was extended to once per
year while the participation lifespan of two years was maintained. Requiring a panel
of at least three periods we, therefore, use data from the original ECPF from 1985 to
1996. Similar to the LISS panel, we select the following private goods: clothing, food
consumed outside of the household and consumption of non–durable articles. Price
data is also published by INE.Descriptive statistics of all datasets can be found in Table
7 in Appendix A.5. Table 1 and Table 2 present the results in the form of p-values for
different combinations of periods with and without covariates, respectively.
Two aspects of our results are worth noting. First, while there is overwhelm-
ing evidence to reject the stable–preference hypothesis for the RLMS, there are some
combination of periods for which there is not enough evidence to arrive at this con-
clusion. In any of these cases, we either have three consecutive years in which we
are faced with little power of revealed preference axioms due to the lack of price vari-
ation, or a particularly small sample size due to the wider span of considered years
in combination with (random) attrition. This all points towards the trade–off dis-
cussed above. Second, our sample for the ECPF is very small, particularly for single
households. Abstracting from the inferior statistical properties of the test in small
samples (the numerical procedure still converges), the strong rejection of the hypo-
thesis seems to indicate that it is harder to find a rationalisation of types when we






In this section we discuss extensions regarding the two main assumptions made in this
paper: no consumption externalities, and time stability of preferences. However, it
should be noted that identification under these extensions comes at the expense of
loosing general preference heterogeneity.
To account for arbitrary consumption externalities, let us augment our random
utilitymodel by implementing a linear consumption technology (Barten, 1964; Brown-






um (xm, x f , εm) + µ(p, εµ)u f (x f , xm, ε f )
}
(4)
s.t. z ∈ Bt =
{
x | pt x ≤ w t
}
z = A(x f + xm),
where A is a diagonal matrix with elements ranging from 0.5 (entirely public good)
to 1.0 (entirely private good). The production technology matrix A is not identified
in the context of arbitrary unobserved heterogeneity such as our revealed preference
setting. Thuswewill impose estimates from (Cherchye et al., 2017), a study conducted
using the LISS panel, one of the datasets used in this paper. This restricts us to use
public goods from the intersection of their study and the datasets we consider. Our








They, arguably, represent goods subject to consumption externalities taking values
about half way on the spectrum from public to private. While the specifications
for the RLMS and LISS contain only public goods, this approach allows for arbit-
rary combinations of public and private goods by setting Aii = 1 for purely private
goods i ∈ IL. Because the ECPF only has different forms of transportation and no
information on housing and energy consumption, for this dataset we use clothing,
transportation and petrol. We obtain secondary house price indices (HPI) from the
same sources as the respective consumer price indices (CPI). Table 3 and 4 present the
results, respectively, confirming the evidence we find in the context of private goods.
Regarding time stability of preferences, there are a range of possible approaches, all
of which come at the expense of requiring additional strong and non-testable assump-
tions. First, it is possible to extend the type space as follows. Keeping the number
of total types X unchanged we could extend the space of marginal choices Xr to the




× {1, 2, 3}.
For couples this additionally requires encoding the product space of possible sub-
regions of the budget planes relevant to form equivalence classes for the involved
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double sums. The latter comes with the caveat that it requires a homotheticity as-
sumption instead of the time-stability assumption. Such a setting would also elimin-
ate all the power of the collective axiom of revealed preference, making this a test of
collective bargaining rather than preference stability. Second, one could make use of a
structural assumption on the utility functions in order to obtain continuous demands
of the form x i t = x (pt , εi) + εi t , where εi is an element of a general probability
space capturing unobserved heterogeneity and εi t is a period specific idiosyncratic
taste shock. Identification of such a specification is treated in Evdokimov (2010). In
such a setting, we would not only lose a lot of identifying variation in prices, but also
the advantage of not having to project observed demands onto budget sets to reduce
the dimension of the choice space, such as Kitamura & Stoye (2018), which again
requires a homotheticity assumption or a revealed price preference setting; c.f. Deb
et al. (2017). Finally, one could resort to a different set of revealed preference axioms,
such as marriage market matching (Cherchye et al., 2017). Again, this would only
substitute the joint restriction tested with a different one, in the matching case the
so-called non-blocking pairs assumption.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a way to incorporate singles for identification in a non-
parametric collective revealed preference setting and used it to construct a test for the
hypothesis of stable preferences. For this, we set up a collective random utility model
and a unitary random utility model and used a discretisation of continuous choices to
revealed preference types for both types of households. We then asked the question
under which conditions we can construct hypothetical matches of different heterogen-
eous individuals into different types of households. In a caring model, this is possible
under the assumption of stable preferences, which formed the basis for our test. By
considering collectively rational couples and a stochastic choice argument, we then
showed that under the null hypothesis of stable preferences, there exists a stochastic
rationalisation of observed choice data. Using data from the Dutch Longitudinal In-
ternet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS), the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS), and the Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF)
16
we strongly rejected the hypothesis.
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A.1 Collective Axiom of Revealed Preference
Definition 1 (Cherchye, De Rock & Vermeulen, 2007). Suppose that there exists a pair
of utility functions u f and um that provide a collective rationalization of the set of obser-
vations
{
(pt ; x̃ ct , x̃
f
t , x̃mt ) : x̃ ct = x̃
f
t + x̃mt , t ∈ IT
}
. Then there exist preference relations15
Rr0 and R





(i) if x̃ sRc0 x̃ t , then x̃ sR
f
0 x̃ t or x̃ sR
m
0 x̃ t
(ii) if x̃ sRr0 x̃ s1 , x̃ s1R
r
0 x̃ s2 , . . ., x̃ sSR
r
0 x̃ t then x̃ sR




(iii) if x̃ sRc0 x̃ t and x̃ tR
r x̃ s , then x̃ sRr
′
0 x̃ t for r ≠ r




(iv) if x̃ sRc0
(
x̃ t1 + x̃ t2
)
and x̃ t1Rr x̃ s then x̃ sRr
′
0 x̃ t2 for r ≠ r









x̃ s1 + x̃ s2
) )
(vi) if x̃ sR f x̃ t and x̃ sRm x̃ t , then ¬
(
x̃ tRc0 x̃ s
)
where Rr is defined as x̃ sRr0 x̃ t whenever ps x̃
r
s ≥ ps x̃ rt and Rr is the transitive closure of
Rr0 (Afriat, 1967; Varian, 1982).
15Note that Rc0 is just notation and not actually a preference relation, since household consumption
is only a result of individual preferences.
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A.2 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. The equivalences between (i), (ii) and (iii)’ are shown in McFadden
& Richter (1991); McFadden (2005). Statement (iii)’ referenced therein, differs from
(iii) in that it additionally requires ιT ν = 1. We now show that this is implied. It is
easy to see that by construction of A for any solution of the quadratic problem we
have η = π and since 3 = ιT π = ιT Aν = 3ιT ν by construction of the 3-petite graph,
we get ιT ν = 1. Thus constraint ν ≥ 0 in is sufficient for η to be on the probability
simplex.
It will be useful to write this problem with a tightened cone constraint indexed
by ν . Let L be a lower diagonal matrix from the Cholesky decomposition Ω = LLT .
Then we can rewrite the quadratic form (iii) as
min
η∈{Aν |ν≥ν}
(π − η)T LLT (π − η).




(π − A(ν + s))T LLT (π − A(ν + s)).






sT ATΩAs − sT ATΩ(π − Aν)
}
.
Letting H = ATΩA and f (π, ν) = −ATΩ(π − Aν) we get a canonical form of a
non-negative least squares problem, with gradient for iteration τ ≥ 0 defined as µτ =
HT sτ+ f (π, ν). Johansson et al. (2006) show that component–wise projection sτ+1, j =
max(0, sτ, j−µτ, jd j ) where d = diag(H ι)−1 and j ∈ I |X
0 | referring to the j th component
of s will find the solution of the problem. 
A.3 A Minimal Example
To test the collective model using revealed preferences, at least three periods and three
different goods are needed. This section discusses the strategy and dimensionality of
our test in such a minimal setting.
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Figure 2: Three intersecting budget sets Bred, Bblue, Bgreen with three goods





= IT . In the figure on the right hand side the green and blue budgets are
removed and only the lines in which they intersect with the remaining red budget are plotted.
We can make revealed preference statements whenever some bundle of goods was
chosen, but a different less expensive one would have been affordable. In Figure 2,
the colors of the budget sets are defined such that whenever a household chose one
of the four regions on a budget set that was above another budget set, then the good
corresponding to this color is revealed preferred to the good corresponding to the
color of the other budget set. For example if a single female household picks one of
the lower quadrants of the red budget such that pbluexred ≤ predxred, we can say that
xred R f xblue.
To clarify the construction of preference types from continuous data, we will now
consider an example of a hypothetical household match, faced with the respective





a single male consuming xmr , xmb and x
m
g and consider them to be matched into a
couple of type equivalent to one consuming x cr , x cb and x
c
g . We normalize household
endowment to one. Their consumption satisfies the following inequalities which con-
tain all the necessary information to characterise the matched household in terms of
preference relations which can be checked against the Collective Axiom of Revealed
22
Preference.
pb x cr ≥ 1, pg x cr ≥ 1, pr (x cb + x
c
g ) ≥ 1 pb xmr ≤ 1, pg xmr ≥ 1, pb x
f
r ≥ 1, pg x
f
r ≤ 1
pr x cb ≥ 1, pg x
c
b ≥ 1, pb (x
c
r + x cg ) ≥ 1 pr xmb ≥ 1, pg x
m
b ≤ 1, pr x
f
b ≥ 1, pg x
f
b ≥ 1
pr x cg ≤ 1, pb x cg ≥ 1, pg (x cr + x cb ) ≤ 1 pr x
m
g ≥ 1, pb xmg ≥ 1, pr x
f




If f and m were to be matched together, the inequalities restricting x c represent one




0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0

























Table 5 shows different violations of the collective axiom. Situation (1) is a trivial
violation of individual SARP by f . In the example above we have situation (2), in
which the preference relation Rm0 is one of a person who prefers good A over good B
and good B over good C. Thus he must also prefer good A over good C by transitivity,
for which there is no contradicting revelation of preferences. Hence, this person is
rational. The preference relation of R f0 also represents a rational person, who prefers
good A over good C. This implies that both individuals prefer good A over good C,
but aggregate household consumption represented by Rc0 revealed that the household
chose goodCover goodA; a violation of theCollectiveAxiomofRevealed Preference.
This households also violates type (3), in which it could have consumed both A and
B , but chose to consume only C instead, making both individuals worse off.





enting single males and single females, respectively. For couples, we have to evaluate
inequalities for double-sums according to Definition 1 (iv) & (v), for which we have
2κ different possibilities with κ = 12T (T − 1) = 3 which results in 4
3 ∗ 23 = 512
choices. In total, we thus have |X| = 512 ∗ 64 ∗ 64 = 2, 097, 152 matched household
types. Applying a revealed preference test for this universe of types and removing
the ones that violate the collective axiom under the preference stability assumption,
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we end up with |X0 | = 2, 996 matched household types. |Xcollective | = 475, 136 are
consistent with the collective axiom based on the necessary conditions using only ag-
gregate household consumption data. This leaves us with about 22.7% collectively
rational types. From this, we should not necessarily conclude a restrictive nature of
the collective model since for a given range of budget planes only a subset of the total
choice set would actually be feasible (e.g. have positive demands). Hence we obtain
a matrix A with 512 + 64 + 64 = 640 rows and 2, 996 columns representing rational
types under the stable preference assumption. The vector π is a vector of choice prob-
abilities of the population of the same dimension: 640. The matrix is sparse and only
has 3|X0 | = 3 ∗ 2, 996 non-zero items.
A.4 Simulations
In this section, we investigate the properties of our proposed test in a simulation set-
ting. In particular, we are interested in how much power it has to detect a violation
of the stable preference assumption and whether or not it has a correct proportion
of false positives. Since specifying a parametric continuous demand system requires
at least five goods to impose the SNR(S-1) condition on the Slutsky matrix and dis-
tinguish the collective model from the unitary model, we will not sample continuous
demands as functions of prices and individual budget constraints, but rather draw our
sample directly from the discrete choice space.16 This should be interpreted as a con-
tinuous uniform distribution of choices on different budget planes, where the relative
prices are such that the partitions of the budget planes are of equal size. Recall that
we test this against the set of households which are consistent with the necessary con-
ditions of the collective axioms based on aggregate consumption but not consistent
when single data and the stable preference assumption is added. This set is denoted by
X1 and we have Xcollective = X0 ∪X1. If we reject the null hypothesis that both the col-
lective axiom and the stable preference assumption holds, by excluding all irrational
matches X \ Xcollective, we must conclude that the stable preference assumption does
not hold. To control the proportion of households for whom this is the case (our
16A revealed preference based setting allows us to test the restrictions of the model with only three
goods (Cherchye, De Rock & Vermeulen, 2007), whereas Browning & Chiappori (1998) need five
goods.
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data generating process) we introduce the parameter p which specifies the probability
that a particular choice is both collectively rational and satisfies the stable preference
assumption p := P (x ∈ X0).17 By only considering collectively rational choices in
our simulations we thus have 1 − p = P (x ∉ X0) = P (x ∈ X1) by construction.
Our simulation setting is as follows. We consider S = 100 samples of size N ∈
{500, 1000, 2000} where N = N f = Nm = Nc such that N = 3N in a minimal setting
with T = 3 periods which we construct by drawing bN pc indices from the space of
collectively rational matches X0 for which the stable preference assumption holds and
dN (1 − p)e indices from the space of collectively rational types X1 which does not
satisfy the assumption. Based on a sample of matches, we then calculate the choice
probabilities π̂ accordingly. For estimation, we only use the marginal distribution of
choices of each sample of household compositions and draw B = 100 samples from
the respective empirical distributions (i.e. with replacement) to calculate πbτN and
estimate the empirical distribution of the test statistic J τNN ,b . These simulations are
repeated for p ∈ {0.75, 0.85, 0.9, 0.95, 0.975, 0.99, 1.00}.
Figure 3 shows the power of our test against the non-stable preference alternative
as a function of p, with sample-size N = 500 for the left-hand side graph, and N =
1000 for the right-hand side graph, respectively. We use monotone cubic splines to
17This rationality parameter is similar as for example λ in Dette, Hoderlein & Neumeyer (2016)
which specifies the population’s deviation from Slutsky symmetry.
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interpolate between the actual simulation results, which are marked as solid dots. To
be more precise, the respective functions refer to sample rejection frequencies using
the rejection rule J ↦→ 1
{
J > F̂ −1JN (1 − α)
}
for α ∈ {0.01, 0.05, 0.10}. In addition to
this, we also observe that as N increases the power of our test improves and is able
to correctly reject the hypothesis of a collectively rational population already at small
proportions p.
The intercepts of these functions should be interpreted as the proportion of false
positives (type I errors) since they correspond to the case where everyone is rational.
One might expect that for a correctly sized test the empirical rejection frequencies
should tend to α. However, given our partial identification procedure we have a com-
posite null hypothesis, i.e. the probability of a type I error should be at most α as
defined in equation (3). To see this note that every vector of "true" choice frequencies
denoted by π0 lying in the interior of the cone will have projection residuals of length
zero. Bootstrapping out of π̂ which tends to π0 using the usual regularity properties
could then lead to a confidence interval which is always entirely in the interior of the
cone and we would never wrongly reject the null hypothesis. This also implies that
in such a case our bootstrap distribution is degenerate and has mass one at point zero.
In our Monte Carlo setting and the case where p = 1.0, we randomly select types
from the type-space X0, satisfying collective rationality. Thus the "true" parameter
vector ν0 is assumed to have a uniform distribution over the probability simplex and
the worst-case, namely to get a ν such that π0 = Aν is on the boundary of the cone
with respect to any of its dimensions, occurs with measure zero.
Thus, in order to evaluate whether the size of our test is correct under the test’s
minimax strategy, we have to construct a worst case. For this, note that the test is
constructed in a way that considers hypothetical types by taking combinations of
possible household choice behaviour per price regime over a range of price regimes.
To fix notation, we will call two collectively rational matches similar if there is at least
one element in the product space spanned by these two matches which is an element
of the space of collectively rational matches that do not satisfy the stable preference
hypothesis. We will then construct worst cases by specifying a distribution over n0
such similar matches. To make sure that our π0 is on the boundary of the cone in all
dimensions, i.e. on the cusp, we shift the cone by manually controlling the tightening
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parameter τN according to this distribution. Figure 4 shows simulation results for two
such worst case scenarios with 5 similar matches and 2 similar matches, respectively.
The size results do not seem to deteriorate much with the number of worst case
matches included in the sample. Since the properties of the test are based on an asymp-
totic argument, we should see the empirical frequency of false positives tending to the
respective α which define the rejection rules and are plotted on the x -axis. The results
are what one would expect, with all sample sizes being reasonably accurate. Since in a
well-behaved test, false-positives are by definition rather rare events, in order to min-
imize simulation uncertainty, we increased the number of Monte Carlo repetitions to
S = 500 and the number of bootstrap repetitions to B = 200, which greatly increased
computational complexity due to the high dimensionality of the testing problem.
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A.5 Descriptive Statistics
Table 6: Descriptive Statistics (Private Goods)
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)
Food out Clothing Leisure
Year N Mean IQR P Mean IQR P Mean IQR P
2009 5594 43.463 45.0 108.1 69.825 60.0 107.4 20.121 20.0 98.6
2010 5337 38.798 50.0 109.7 71.835 75.0 105.3 23.362 20.0 98.0
2012 5463 40.611 50.0 113.4 74.347 80.0 106.6 23.743 25.0 100.4
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RMLS)
Dairy Bread Meat
Year N Mean IQR P Mean IQR P Mean IQR P
2000 1506 81.7 120.4 121.1 113.2 102.8 116.5 322.0 439.7 128.3
2005 1601 222.3 277.8 110.5 199.3 171.8 103.0 1003.5 1175.8 118.6
2010 2839 475.7 492.7 116.7 303.3 270.8 107.6 1862.1 1926.0 105.3
2011 2983 520.3 544.8 106.3 317.3 270.9 108.9 2165.8 2154.7 109.2
2012 3154 551.0 550.5 104.4 330.2 291.7 112.0 2284.8 2315.0 108.3
2013 3076 617.7 622.9 113.1 352.9 287.1 108.0 2366.2 2399.8 97.0
2014 2516 695.3 675.8 114.4 372.9 323.0 107.5 2805.6 2847.5 102.1
Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF)
Clothing Food out Nondurables
Year N Mean IQR P Mean IQR P Mean IQR P
1985 65 1284.4 1406.4 165.7 940.9 899.7 174.3 35.1 43.8 150.6
1986 95 1334.8 1545.3 191.6 927.3 1128.1 224.7 28.8 47.6 164.5
1987 288 1743.3 1897.1 174.2 1054.7 1244.8 191.5 37.0 53.8 157.2
1988 195 1537.6 1831.0 158.1 1036.2 1400.9 160.0 42.6 53.3 145.8
1989 225 2253.9 2344.4 134.3 1446.3 1685.6 139.6 57.2 70.5 140.7
1990 205 2289.9 2565.5 106.6 1636.4 2152.1 112.2 41.0 53.2 101.9
1991 210 2255.2 2398.5 183.5 1852.4 2229.4 208.7 52.5 66.7 160.8
1992 202 2652.5 2795.1 154.5 1852.6 1957.9 154.5 69.1 85.4 144.0
1993 185 2823.0 2471.3 112.4 2386.2 3022.2 121.0 75.7 80.8 114.5
1994 210 2102.8 2471.0 106.4 2322.7 2730.5 111.2 79.8 97.4 102.9
1995 194 2186.9 2287.9 113.6 2068.9 2187.8 122.2 117.8 118.3 114.4
1996 199 2397.4 2595.2 126.5 2761.4 3230.4 126.6 107.5 129.6 129.5
Note: Descriptive statistics of the LISS, RMLS and ECPF reporting mean, interquantile range (IQR)
and price index P. LISS quantities consumed per month are inflated to 2005 prices and denoted in
Euro (source: Eurostat http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/hicp/html/hicp_coicop_
inx_index.en.html). RMLS quantities are per week and inflated to 2014 prices and denoted in
local currency (Russian Ruble). Goods are aggregated to composite good categories as follows. Dairy:
Canned/powdered milk, fresh milk, sour milk products and sour cream; Bread: White (wheat) bread
and black (rye) bread; Meat: Canned meat, beef/veal, lamb/goat, pork, giblets, poultry, lard, sausage
and semi-prepared meat products. ECPF consumption is per week with quarterly collection frequency.
We only report descriptive statistics of the first quarter of a given year. ECPF quantities are normalized
to arbitrary units using the price indices P.
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Table 7: Descriptive Statistics (Public Goods)
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)
Housing Transport Energy
Year N Mean IQR P Mean IQR P Mean IQR P
2009 5594 590.6 460.0 108.1 141.1 150.0 107.4 282.0 123.0 98.6
2010 5337 600.1 449.5 109.7 135.2 150.0 105.3 210.4 125.5 98.0
2012 5463 577.4 475.0 113.4 148.2 150.0 106.6 219.1 116.0 100.4
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RMLS)
Housing Transport Energy
Year N Mean IQR P Mean IQR P Mean IQR P
2000 1506 4388.4 6051.9 116.3 2942.3 670.7 29.0 3454.2 0.0 5.7
2005 1601 7961.1 9264.3 118.0 2996.0 2282.5 117.9 3808.0 1280.2 18.0
2010 2839 12336.3 11699.2 102.7 3697.7 2437.6 240.0 3976.4 2226.7 43.8
2011 2983 12324.6 11744.0 112.1 3697.0 2500.1 234.0 4496.1 2500.1 48.3
2012 3154 12349.8 11444.4 112.1 3799.7 2699.0 250.5 4413.2 3922.6 55.3
2013 3076 13018.6 11098.5 103.6 4109.9 2591.4 270.9 4958.9 4311.5 63.6
2014 2516 13576.1 11050.0 105.1 4169.0 2550.0 275.3 5238.0 5100.0 63.8
Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF)
Clothing Transport Petrol
Year N Mean IQR P Mean IQR P Mean IQR P
1985 65 1284.4 1406.4 165.7 553.0 942.6 188.9 183.4 41.8 92.7
1986 95 1334.8 1545.3 191.6 647.9 1002.6 277.0 120.8 0.0 112.4
1987 288 1743.3 1897.1 174.2 612.5 1000.7 213.2 190.3 48.6 98.2
1988 195 1537.6 1831.0 158.1 658.1 1050.2 154.2 244.0 172.8 86.4
1989 225 2253.9 2344.4 134.3 681.2 1120.6 119.6 397.2 314.0 95.1
1990 205 2289.9 2565.5 106.6 617.2 1017.1 115.1 451.4 254.2 114.6
1991 210 2255.2 2398.5 183.5 999.5 1252.6 244.6 493.3 398.2 105.0
1992 202 2652.5 2795.1 154.5 838.8 1307.8 147.2 459.3 437.0 90.6
1993 185 2823.0 2471.3 112.4 1099.0 1631.4 119.9 481.2 318.0 122.4
1994 210 2102.8 2471.0 106.4 1101.0 1559.4 114.4 752.0 959.9 113.4
1995 194 2186.9 2287.9 113.6 1005.7 1470.0 119.4 497.9 561.0 125.1
1996 199 2397.4 2595.2 126.5 1302.5 1954.3 112.1 667.5 938.7 106.3
Note: Descriptive statistics of the LISS, RMLS and ECPF reporting mean, interquantile range (IQR)
and price index P. LISS quantities consumed per month are inflated to 2005 prices (CPI and HPI)
and denoted in Euro (source: Eurostat http://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/prices/hicp/html/
hicp_coicop_inx_index.en.html). RMLS quantities are per week and inflated to 2014 prices and
denoted in local currency (Russian Ruble). Goods are aggregated to composite good categories as
follows. Transport: Transportation services, running costs for cars (excluding fuel) and Energy: Fuel,
Gas, Coal and Firewood. ECPF consumption is per week with quarterly collection frequency. We
only report descriptive statistics of the first quarter of a given year. ECPF quantities are normalized to
arbitrary units using the price indices P. We chose a combination of private and public goods due to
the limited availability of the latter.
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Table 1: Results for Private Goods with Exogenous Prices
Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)







2009 2010 2012 715 663 542 466 0.000
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)







2012 2013 2014 327 315 305 295 0.027
2011 2013 2014 316 304 281 275 0.017
2011 2012 2014 314 307 283 276 0.020
2011 2012 2013 332 321 312 306 0.187
2010 2013 2014 258 249 217 213 0.033
2010 2012 2014 256 248 221 217 0.060
2010 2012 2013 268 257 243 235 0.043
2010 2011 2013 268 260 239 235 0.057
2010 2011 2012 298 293 268 262 0.120
2005 2011 2012 264 256 220 214 0.180
Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF)







19943 19941 19942 111 106 6 6 0.007
19934 19941 19942 111 106 8 8 0.000
19922 19923 19921 97 88 16 13 0.000
19904 19911 19912 98 94 14 13 0.020
19893 19891 19892 113 105 6 6 0.000
19882 19883 19884 106 103 7 5 0.000
19871 19872 19873 131 128 8 6 0.000
19864 19871 19872 164 157 9 6 0.003
19863 19864 19871 141 135 8 7 0.000
19863 19864 19862 135 130 9 8 0.007
Note: Number of total couples, rational couples according to aggregate CARP, total singles and ra-
tional singles according to SARP, for different combinations of periods.
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Table 2: Results Conditional on Demographics for Private Goods, Exogenous Prices
Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)







2009 2010 2012 1 2 97 93 91 80 0.077
2009 2010 2012 1 1 191 178 108 90 0.000
2009 2010 2012 1 0 84 76 75 64 0.083
2009 2010 2012 0 2 156 142 146 113 0.000
2009 2010 2012 0 1 141 125 96 74 0.000
2009 2010 2012 0 0 42 37 26 21 0.003
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)







2012 2013 2014 2 76 75 137 131 0.003
2012 2013 2014 1 201 191 134 131 0.000
2012 2013 2014 0 50 49 34 33 0.010
2011 2013 2014 2 70 69 124 120 0.000
2011 2013 2014 1 194 185 121 120 0.000
2011 2013 2014 0 52 50 36 35 0.183
2011 2012 2014 2 71 70 125 121 0.000
2011 2012 2014 1 193 188 123 121 0.043
2011 2012 2014 0 50 49 35 34 0.050
2011 2012 2013 2 78 77 138 132 0.060
2011 2012 2013 1 198 190 131 131 0.010
2011 2012 2013 0 56 54 43 43 0.010
2010 2013 2014 2 53 53 89 86 0.020
2010 2013 2014 1 153 145 93 92 0.070
2010 2013 2014 0 52 51 35 35 0.000
2010 2012 2014 2 53 53 91 87 0.000
2010 2012 2014 1 151 145 96 96 0.003
2010 2012 2014 0 52 50 34 34 0.017
2010 2012 2013 2 59 59 101 95 0.000
2010 2012 2013 1 154 144 103 102 0.003
2010 2012 2013 0 55 54 39 38 0.040
2010 2011 2013 2 59 59 101 97 0.027
2010 2011 2013 1 155 149 99 99 0.000
2010 2011 2013 0 54 52 39 39 0.200
2010 2011 2012 2 77 77 120 115 0.003
2010 2011 2012 1 164 160 107 107 0.040
2010 2011 2012 0 57 56 41 40 0.007
2005 2011 2012 2 52 50 104 101 0.083
2005 2011 2012 1 122 119 77 75 0.053
2005 2011 2012 0 90 87 39 38 0.100
Note: Number of total couples, rational couples according to aggregate CARP, total singles and ra-
tional singles according to SARP, for different combinations of periods and demographics.
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Table 3: Results for Public Goods with Exogenous Prices
Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)







2009 2010 2012 1650 1325 498 412 0.000
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)







2012 2013 2014 327 299 305 284 0.033
2011 2013 2014 316 296 281 258 0.007
2011 2012 2014 314 295 283 261 0.030
2011 2012 2013 332 301 312 282 0.027
2010 2013 2014 258 238 217 200 0.050
2010 2012 2014 256 239 221 201 0.107
2010 2012 2013 268 241 243 218 0.013
2010 2011 2013 268 246 239 214 0.013
2010 2011 2012 298 277 268 243 0.053
2005 2011 2012 264 240 220 192 0.037
Spanish Continuous Family Expenditure Survey (ECPF)







19943 19941 19942 111 105 6 4 0.080
19934 19941 19942 111 105 8 4 0.000
19922 19923 19921 97 90 16 15 0.000
19904 19911 19912 98 94 14 12 0.000
19893 19891 19892 113 104 6 3 0.023
19882 19883 19884 106 94 7 4 0.100
19871 19872 19873 131 121 8 6 0.030
19864 19871 19872 164 152 9 5 0.040
19863 19864 19871 141 127 8 7 0.000
19863 19864 19862 135 120 9 9 0.000
Note: Number of total couples, rational couples according to aggregate CARP, total singles and ra-
tional singles according to SARP, for different combinations of periods.
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Table 4: Results Conditional on Demographics for Public Goods, Exogenous Prices
Longitudinal Internet studies for the Social Sciences (LISS)







2009 2010 2012 1 2 199 166 83 74 0.020
2009 2010 2012 1 1 469 401 96 82 0.000
2009 2010 2012 1 0 259 207 69 47 0.040
2009 2010 2012 0 2 289 246 135 117 0.003
2009 2010 2012 0 1 318 250 88 74 0.023
2009 2010 2012 0 0 91 63 24 18 0.287
Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS)







2012 2013 2014 2 76 68 137 128 0.017
2012 2013 2014 1 201 180 134 124 0.017
2012 2013 2014 0 50 44 34 32 0.207
2011 2013 2014 2 70 65 124 114 0.000
2011 2013 2014 1 194 180 121 112 0.007
2011 2013 2014 0 52 50 36 31 0.000
2011 2012 2014 2 71 65 125 114 0.020
2011 2012 2014 1 193 178 123 115 0.020
2011 2012 2014 0 50 49 35 31 0.010
2011 2012 2013 2 78 71 138 124 0.037
2011 2012 2013 1 198 174 131 119 0.017
2011 2012 2013 0 56 52 43 39 0.000
2010 2013 2014 2 53 48 89 81 0.023
2010 2013 2014 1 153 140 93 86 0.063
2010 2013 2014 0 52 48 35 32 0.020
2010 2012 2014 2 53 46 91 80 0.023
2010 2012 2014 1 151 143 96 90 0.100
2010 2012 2014 0 52 49 34 30 0.033
2010 2012 2013 2 59 53 101 90 0.020
2010 2012 2013 1 154 135 103 92 0.060
2010 2012 2013 0 55 49 39 36 0.000
2010 2011 2013 2 59 54 101 91 0.010
2010 2011 2013 1 155 138 99 90 0.010
2010 2011 2013 0 54 52 39 33 0.000
2010 2011 2012 2 77 70 120 107 0.033
2010 2011 2012 1 164 151 107 99 0.007
2010 2011 2012 0 57 55 41 37 0.050
2005 2011 2012 2 52 45 104 89 0.010
2005 2011 2012 1 122 110 77 70 0.057
2005 2011 2012 0 90 78 39 33 0.110
Note: Number of total couples, rational couples according to aggregate CARP, total singles and ra-
tional singles according to SARP, for different combinations of periods and demographics.
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Table 5: Violations of the Collective Axiom









Note: Nodes refer to different consumption bundles. The red solid line to the wife’s preference relation
R f0 , the red dotted line to the implied transitive closure R
f , the blue dashed line to the husband’s
preference relation Rm0 , and the black solid line to the household "preference" relation.
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